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1. Introduction 
 
Temporality is a foundational topic in phenomenological psychopathology, and it plays an 
especially important role in its analysis of depression and melancholia (e.g., Fuchs, 2001; 
Fuchs, 2013; Gallagher, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2015). An intuitive strategy is to explain abnormal 
experiences of time by appealing to a fundamental disruption of the temporal structure of 
consciousness, yet Lenzo and Gallagher (this volume) highlight that this strategy is 
problematic. Let us consider the following autobiographical account of time experience in 
depression, which is cited as a paradigmatic example by Ratcliffe (2012): 
 
I am in a time-locked place, where the moment I am in will stretch on, agonizingly, 
for ever. There is no possibility of redemption or hope. It is a final giving up on 
everything. It is death. (Lott, 1996, p. 247) 
 
It is tempting to hypothesize that the structure of time consciousness underlying this kind of 
abnormal experience is similarly abnormal, i.e. dominated by the past without any forward-
looking element. In a separate context Gallagher (2017b, p. 97) imagines that kind of 
situation as follows: “If there were only retentions, everything I experience would already 
have just happened; we would be pure witnesses without the potential to engage.” This 
hypothetical experience does capture key aspects of the phenomenology of depression, but 
there are reasons for concern.  
 
Specifically, it seems more accurate to identify the moment when only retentions remain in 
someone’s stream of consciousness with the moment that stream comes to an end. In other 
words, it is the onset of death, and we therefore have reached a basic limit of thought 
experimentation. As Shakespeare once pointed out, we simply do not know what dreams – 
if any – may come. To be fair, as exemplified by the autobiographical quote above, people 
with severe depression often report being trapped inside a dying body (Fuchs, 2005). And 
yet they continue to live and to experience, which means that they did not suffer a total 
disintegration of the diachronic structure of temporality (Fuchs, 2017).  
 
Lenzo and Gallagher suggest that we need to more clearly distinguish between (a) the flow 
of experience and (b) the experience of flow. In addition, they propose to reorient the focus 
of analysis to some of the other structural syntheses that are necessary for the constitution 
of subjectivity and objectivity. More specifically, they suggest that the locus of depression is 
not a disruption of the primary passive temporal synthesis, but rather of the primary passive 
associative and affective syntheses.  
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I agree with Lenzo and Gallagher about the diagnosis of the theoretical problem, and I also 
partially agree with their proposed remedy, although I will suggest that, in the end, we will 
need a more radical treatment. In the rest of this commentary I will therefore complement 
their contribution in three respects:  
 
1) I extend their critical discussion to schizophrenia, where we find the same 
problematic appeals to a disruption of fundamental temporal structure;  
 
2) I radicalize their positive proposal by showing that once we distinguish between the 
experience of flow and the flow of experience, we can also envision a more general 
distinction between phenomenality and structure of consciousness; and  
 
3) I highlight that this more general distinction has important implications for the 
naturalization of phenomenology, in particular by supporting growing calls for a 
reconceptualization of the scientific concept of nature. 
 
2. From temporality to affectivity 
 
Since the late 1990s the insights of phenomenological philosophy and embodied cognitive 
science have been brought together in a mutually informing manner. An important point of 
contact was the structure of time consciousness, and this has been explored in quite some 
detail (Varela, 1999), including with respect to abnormal experience in schizophrenia.  
 
For example, Gallagher applied this interdisciplinary approach to the characteristic symptom 
of thought insertion (Gallagher, 2005, pp. 173-205; Gallagher & Varela, 2003). While it is 
normal to occasionally experience unbidden thoughts, memories, and fantasies, there is still 
a sense that these experiences are originating within one’s stream of consciousness. But this 
lingering sense of passive generation is argued to disappear along with protention: “Without 
protention, thought continues, but it appears already made, not generated in my own 
stream of consciousness” (Gallagher & Varela, 2003, p. 117). However, in line with Lenzo 
and Gallagher’s recommendation, we should refrain from positing such a fundamental 
disruption of temporality. Protention is inseparable from the stream of consciousness: the 
now, as the present phase of consciousness, is constituted by way of fulfilment of an 
otherwise empty protention (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2014). It is questionable to what extent a 
subject’s thoughts, or even experience more generally, can continue without protention.  
 
Again, the key problem is that the fundamental structural level of consciousness is an all-or-
nothing affair: either there is a continuous stream of consciousness or there is not. There is 
no middle way. As the work of Husserl and of later phenomenologists revealed, the basic 
unit of time-consciousness, i.e. the present moment, has a concrete duration; it is not an 
abstract point on a line, but a temporal field that dynamically gives rise to the now (“primal 
impression”) on the basis of the nearly-present (“protention”) continuously slipping into the 
just-past (“retention”). Given that this recursive slippage results in a nested, or even fractal-
like temporal organization, the present moments become structurally linked into an 
internally unified whole, and thereby constitute the foundation for subjectivity and its 
meaningful engagement with the objective world (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2014). But this 
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foundation in a tripartite temporality is precarious: remove any of the parts, and the whole 
subject disappears. 
 
Gallagher and Varela (2003, p. 120) seem to have sensed this tension because later on they 
emphasize that “the schizophrenic phenomenology is not simply a structural or logical 
problem.” Accordingly, they moved from an abstract structural explication of protention to 
a process of protention which is always already suffused by an affective tone determined by 
the past, and which is rooted in and constrained by distributed patterns of neurobiological 
dynamics, in line with Varela’s (1999) neurophenomenology research program.  
 
3. From affectivity to phenomenality 
 
Lenzo and Gallagher build on this work on the deep connection between temporality and 
affectivity to show how there can be temporal alterations in depressive experience without 
a disruption of the most fundamental level of temporal synthesis. Their proposal is to shift 
the disruption from the primary temporal synthesis to a less fundamental level of structural 
synthesis, and thereby preserve the unity of time consciousness.  
 
They argue that a moment of experience that affects us strongly will attract our attention in 
such a way that it evokes far-reaching chains of associations of experiences that relevantly 
precede and follow it, and the moment will therefore appear as longer. This alteration can 
assume pathological proportions: an intensely affecting past experience, say a trauma, can 
be so prominent that it consistently reorients attention to that past moment, while the 
concomitantly evoked past associations overwhelm what is happening now. This is a 
plausible account of how differences in affectivity can give rise to differences in lived 
duration. However, it is not clear whether this account can also explain why it seems like 
time itself has ceased to flow. For example, occasionally I may feel overwhelmed by 
associations evoked by a prominent moment in my past, but I experience these unwanted 
associations in the present moment as part of my normal stream of consciousness.  
 
I think the way forward is to radicalize Lenzo and Gallagher’s proposal and further bracket 
the general strategy of appealing to structural differences to understand phenomenal 
differences. There are hints in their analysis that an alternative strategy could appeal to the 
feeling of prominence, relevance, or salience directly: what makes the key difference is not 
a prominent moment’s quantity of associations, but rather the personal significance of its 
felt quality. This strategic reorientation involves a subtle but significant shift in the roles 
played by affectivity, which ambiguously refers to both being passively affected and to felt 
affect (Sass, 2004). I propose to replace Lenzo and Gallagher’s focus on the former role with 
an emphasis on the latter role, which is at the core of the subject’s “lived self-acquaintance” 
(Zahavi, 2005, p. 80) or “affective self-familiarity” (Fuchs, 2017) across time.  
 
For example, we can imagine that an ordinary experience, like being lost in thoughts and 
spontaneously deciding to cross the street on the way home, can go nearly unnoticed if it 
has no further significant consequences, and yet become a target for obsessive attention if 
it leads to traumatic consequences. The fundamental structural differences between the 
moments surrounding the decision are the same in both scenarios, and yet the valence of 
those differences is incomparable: in the ordinary case the moment of decision retains the 
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same level of valence as the preceding and subsequent moments, while in the traumatic 
case there is a shocking increase in significance of the decision such that the valence of 
differences between the preceding and subsequent moments pales in comparison. And 
without any appreciation of meaningful differences between the moments flowing through 
awareness, time itself may well seem to have stopped flowing altogether. We can compare 
this to the phenomenology of perception: research into inattentional blindness, change 
blindness, and categorical perception has revealed that we often remain unaware of large 
structural changes in the visual scene, and this is facilitated if the changes do not impact the 
meaning of what is perceived (Froese & Leavens, 2014). Similarly, people with depression 
may suffer from disordered affect that hides structural differences between moments in 
time by blanketing those differences with indifference, thereby making time itself appear 
stagnant. This disordered affect may have various origins, but trauma can certainly make 
the valence all other changes in life pale in comparison.  
 
4. New horizons for the naturalization of phenomenology 
 
This shift in analysis of affectivity from structural self-affection to phenomenally felt quality 
has broader implications. It points more generally to the relative independence of structural 
dynamics from phenomenology. This is presumably what made the structure of time 
consciousness an appealing starting point for Varela’s naturalization of phenomenology in 
the first place, but it also means that this strategy will not go far. First of all, whereas 
naturalization has mainly focused on how to relate the structures of consciousness with the 
structures of the brain, we also need to relate feelings being alive with our organismic 
embodiment (Fuchs, 2012). But even if the structures of consciousness could be explained 
in terms of whole brain-body-world structures, this would still fail to account for the felt 
quality. It would miss the fundamental subjective dimension of affectivity: 
 
It is an unmediated feeling or sense of aliveness, a sense of certain tonality or 
luminosity of consciousness that founds our existence and is a necessary condition 
for more elaborate levels of self-awareness and for our encountering of the world. 
(Sass, 2004, p. 138) 
 
The only way forward is to bite the bullet and accept that the phenomenal as an irreducible 
element of our existence, and one that can make an important difference in our lives. Yet 
this confronts us head-on with the hardest version of the mind-body problem, which is tied 
with a specific concept of nature:  
 
Anything that could count as a solution to the hard problem would have to buy into 
the assumptions of classic naturalism, since those assumptions define precisely the 
framework within which the hard problem is defined, namely, that a complete 
scientific description of the brain will be deterministic, and completely independent 
of first-person experience. (Gallagher, 2017a, p. 111) 
 
The proposal by Lenzo and Gallagher that “affectivity can disrupt the underlying dynamics”, 
therefore, must ultimately be considered in the context of the “ongoing theoretical struggle 
between the task of remaining scientific (which Varela certainly wanted to do) and 
reconceiving nature (and therefore reconceiving what science actually is)” (Gallagher, 
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2017a, p. 111). I suggest that the new “remedy” – not the solution – of the hard problem, 
i.e., of how subjective affect could make a difference to objective dynamics, needs to 
involve two interdependent tasks: (1) develop an alternative theory of the brain, and of the 
whole organism more generally, that takes incompleteness and nondeterminism as its 
starting point, and (2) develop an account of how first-person experience could make a 
difference to the brain’s or organism’s activity.  
 
Task (1) is slowly taking shape; it does not contradict any empirical evidence, and there is 
evidence that can be interpreted in its support (Froese & Taguchi, 2019). Task (2) is a much 
harder nut to crack, but crack it we must if we want to retain room for the subjective in an 
objective world (Fuchs, 2018). Lenzo and Gallagher’s reference to Jasper’s general 
psychopathology is useful here, especially his claim that both scientific explanation and 
phenomenological understanding are limited. It is tempting to see the objectively 
inexplicable and the subjectively unintelligible as complementary gaps through which the 
intertwinement of the living and lived body takes place, where each side can reach into the 
other, but without violating the defining essence of the other domain (Froese, 2018).  
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